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Book Review
Review of John McMillan, The Methods
of Bioethics: An Essay in Meta-Bioethics
Q1 Reviewed by Jonathan Lewis , Dublin City University
John McMillan begins his new book by reflecting on his
introduction to bioethics in the 1990s. Having been nur-
tured on an intellectual diet of formal semantics of modal
logics, meta-ethics, and theories about the nature of men-
tal states, he recalls how surprised he was to find the bio-
ethical literature so preoccupied with theory. Although
McMillan recognizes that moral theory has its place, he
suggests that by setting bioethics up as a discipline whose
predominant issues are to do with theory, not only are
students insulated from the broadness of its scope and
the diversity of its methods, but the subject comes across
as largely inaccessible to those without some formal train-
ing in normative ethics and of limited practical signifi-
cance to those dealing with concrete issues.
Fortunately, McMillan avers, for those new to bioeth-
ics, there is a better way to get started. Inspired by fig-
ures who were active during the early days of the
discipline, including Margaret Battin, Dan Callahan,
Alastair Campbell, and Jonathan Glover, he seeks to
develop a multifaceted, argument-centered approach to
real ethical issues that is both accessible and applicable
irrespective of one’s disciplinary background.
In part one, McMillan establishes the nature of “good
bioethics.” Drawing upon Alastair Campbell’s notions of
“no special pleading” and “engagement with experi-
ence,” McMillan calls into question more traditional
approaches to bioethics that privilege specific theoretical
positions such as utilitarianism, virtue ethics, principl-
ism, and theology at the expense of interdisciplinary
engagement with moral phenomena of complex situa-
tions. He argues that the essential aims, concerns, and
features of bioethics involve bringing moral reason to
bear on practical and pressing issues in order to generate
reflective, normative arguments that meet the needs of
patients, practitioners, and policymakers. In short,
“bioethics has to connect with the experiences of those
impacted by, and making, decisions in health care” (36);
it must be practically normative “in the sense of attempting
to improve some aspect of the world” (40). Conceived in
this way, bioethics is not just a scholarly discipline that
manifests in publications, conference presentations, and
seminars (15). For McMillan, there is a vital “moral con-
sequentialist” dimension to bioethics in the sense that it
involves contributions to public policy and biomedical
case consultation (11–16). Consequently, he argues that
bioethics cannot be identified with law, philosophical
bioethics, medical ethics, applied ethics, or empirical
ethics. Instead, it requires empirically grounded,
philosophically inspired argumentation (chaps. 2–3).
In part two, McMillan attempts to exorcize the
“specters of bioethics”: theory and the fact/value distinc-
tion. In terms of the former, he is concerned with the
privileged status given to normative moral theories.
Referring to Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s
work in the 1970s, McMillan notes that although it was
helpful to have a moral framework that could simultan-
eously highlight ethical duties, justify moral beliefs, and
provide some coherence and uniformity to the field of
bioethics, such an approach stifled careful reflection
about real issues. He claims that principle-based meth-
ods (as well as those theories that developed in response
to consequentialist, deontological, and pluralist principle
approaches) cannot lead to the formulation of “reasoned
convictions about moral problems” (53).
McMillan refers to theory-driven approaches as exam-
ples of the “ethics sausage machine” (53–63). The point is
that “a theoretically driven approach to bioethics will
mince a variety of background considerations and issues
into a familiar recommendation that is so systematic that,
unless we buy the whole machine, we will not want to
eat the sausage” (54). Focusing his critique on Peter
Singer’s utilitarianism, Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae, neo-
Kantianism, and certain approaches in medical sociology,
McMillan claims that theory-driven approaches include
ingredients (in the form of premises) that prove to be
unpalatable to those dealing with concrete bioethical
issues in an interdisciplinary and undogmatic way.
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In chapter five, McMillan argues that bioethics is still
haunted by the specter of the fact/value distinction. With
the Humean idea that ethical claims cannot be identified
with anything “out there” in the world in the way that
scientific facts purportedly can, it seems that what we
take to be right or wrong cannot be empirically verified.
As a result, some still believe that ethical claims are not
amenable to reason. On the one hand, McMillan suggests
that the fact/value distinction is a helpful reminder that
we must not make unwarranted inferences from descrip-
tive premises to normative conclusions (73–78). On the
other hand, he agrees with the majority of metaethicists
who argue that just because ethical claims may not be
true in the same way as natural facts, that does not mean
that the normative language that distinctively figures in
practical reason is epistemically defunct, nor does it mean
that ethical claims cannot be assessed as legitimate or
illegitimate. For McMillan, the key to assessing legitimacy
is to be attentive to argumentative strategies and the evi-
dence used to inform these arguments.
In the most substantial section of the book, McMillan
offers a detailed account of the methods that constitute
“good bioethics.” This “empirical, Socratic bioethics”
combines cogent arguments, empirical evidence, and
awareness of one’s epistemic fallibilities (chap. 6). Vital
to the Socratic dimension of McMillan’s approach is the
need to address “what if?” questions concerning the dif-
ferent possibilities of concrete situations and the clarifica-
tion, introduction, and testing of morally pertinent
concepts (chaps. 8–10). As a starting point, we require
empirical knowledge of “current issues and devel-
opments” (94). For example, in the case of noninvasive
prenatal testing (NIPT), McMillan suggests that we begin
by identifying and understanding the phenomena that
can be tested, the companies involved, the false positive
rates, and the discussions with women who wish to sign
up for it. Subsequently, our job is to subject this evidence
to critical appraisal. The final stage uses our appraisal of
the evidence in order to construct cogent, factually prem-
ised arguments (chap. 7).
Although McMillan manages to present his account
of “good bioethics” in the first six chapters, the remain-
ing chapters will be invaluable to those who may not be
acquainted with the type of argument-centered, factually
premised approach that he is advocating. In chapter
seven, he explains how to construct cogent arguments.
Chapter eight addresses six different approaches to
speculative reason involving both real and imagined sit-
uations. Finally, in chapters nine and ten, McMillan dis-
cusses the ways in which “good bioethics” requires us to
“draw distinctions.” The point is that concepts such as
“euthanasia,” “medical futility,” “sanctity of life,”
“medical treatment,” and “medicine” can have different
senses with different moral implications. “Good bio-
ethics” generates a requirement to avoid ambiguity in
the ethical concepts that figure in moral arguments. To
that end, a vital concern is not only to clarify the con-
cepts that are used, make explicit important moral dis-
tinctions between concepts, and assess whether a
concept does the normative work that it needs to, but
introduce concepts and conceptual distinctions that have
been suitably clarified in other disciplines.
Bearing in mind the amount of space dedicated to
speculative reason and conceptual analysis, McMillan’s
monograph posits an account of “good bioethics” that,
although empirically aware, is situated more toward the
philosophical end of the methodological spectrum. As a
result, nonphilosophers might find it difficult to fully
comprehend the ways in which their respective disci-
plines can contribute to such an argument-centered, fact-
ually premised account. After all, it is not just
philosophy that suffers from problems internal to the
discipline. Questions concerning the necessary conditions
for something to count as evidence, the validity of causal
inferences, and the practicalities of justifiably making
normative claims based on nonnormative facts have
resulted in well-reasoned disagreement in all areas of
the medical, behavioral, and social sciences. That said,
McMillan includes a number of detailed examples in
order to demonstrate how his approach can work in an
interdisciplinary context. He brings both his negative
and positive accounts of bioethics to bear on an impres-
sively broad range of concrete issues concerning abor-
tion, anencephalic infants, castration of sex offenders,
euthanasia and aid-in-dying, growth attenuation therapy,
noninvasive prenatal testing, reproductive technologies,
persistent vegetative states, and artificial nutrition and
hydration. Consequently, those looking to engage with
bioethics from traditionally nonphilosophical fields
should, with relative ease, be able to identify ways in
which their own expertise and preferred empirical meth-
ods can operate within the Socratic dimension of
McMillan’s approach.
By exploring the nature of bioethics and attempting to
answer the question “what is ‘good bioethics?,’”
McMillan presents an innovative, historically aware, and
zeitgeist-capturing manifesto for contemporary bioethics.
Not only does he consolidate a striking number of
detailed discussions of his own work and that of leading
figures in both bioethics and ethics in general, but he
manages to incorporate pertinent real-world issues in
health care policy and practice. Overall, this book serves
not only as a fresh foundation on which bioethicists from
all disciplines can build, but as a provocative challenge to
traditional theory-laden ways of “doing bioethics.” !
ORCID
Jonathan LewisReviewed by http://orcid.org/0000-0001-
8342-1051
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
The American Journal of Bioethics
2 ajob Month, Volume 0, Number 0, 2019
